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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 20048 
-v- : 
JOSEPH M. LEWIS, i Priority 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
This appeal is from a conviction of forgery, a second 
degree felony, after a trial in the Second District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1987). 
Did the State present sufficient evidence to support 
defendant's conviction? 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1978) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge 
that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another 
without his authority to utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, 
issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been 
executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a copy of an original 
when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" 
includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, 
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second 
degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or 
any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government, or any agency thereof; 
or 
(b) A check with a face amount of 
$100 or more, an issue of stocks, bonds, 
or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
Defendant, Joseph M. Lewis, was charged with forgery, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 
(1978)• 
Defendant was convicted of forgery in a jury trial held 
January 12, 1987, in the Second Judicial District, in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Hyde on January 30, 
1987, to a term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison. 
On Monday, December 8, 1986 at approximately 8:00 p.m. 
defendant entered a business called "Cash-a-Check" in Ogden, Utah 
and requested that a check be cashed (Tr. 8). The check was made 
out to defendant in the amount of $237.22 and was drawn on the 
account of Stacey Enterprises; defendant indicated that it was a 
payroll check (R. 2, 11)• Keith Baer, the manager of Cash-a-
Check, informed defendant that the check could not be cashed 
until the following morning when the bank could be contacted for 
verification (Tr. 8). 
Defendant returned the next morning and completed an 
information card verifying tnat he had not previously cashed a 
check with the Cash-a-Check company (Tr. 9). Mr. Baer became 
suspicious when the check defendant presented did not appear to 
be a payroll check (Tr. 11)• He again told defendant the check 
would have to be verified with the bank and returned to his 
office to verify the check (Tr. 10). Based upon his suspicions 
he contacted Stacey Enterprises where the receptionist stated 
that the company did not use those type of checks for payroll and 
that they had been burglarized at 5:00 a.m. that morning (Tr. 
13). She requested additional time to research the problem (Tr. 
13). Upon later contact with Stacey Enterprises Mr. Baer learned 
that checks had been stolen from the office and that the check in 
question was not valid (Tr. 14). Mr. Baer then contacted the 
police (Tr. 14) and Scott Dixon, the president of Stacey 
Enterprises, and requested their presence at Cash-a-Check. 
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Officer Stallings went to Cash-a-Check and requested 
that defendant accompany him to the station (Tr. 40). At the 
station, defendant told the officer that on December 7, 1987 an 
unidentified man approached him on the 6treet and requested that 
defendant perform some work for him (Tr. 40). Defendant claimed 
that he worked for approximately 3 hours and received the check 
in question for his labor (Tr. 41). 
Scott Dixon also went to Cash-a-Check and stated to 
Otficer Stallings that the defendant had done some work in 
September through SOS temporary services for Stacey Enterprises, 
however, was not employed by the business at the present time 
(Tr. 20-22). The social security number defendant gave SOS 
temporary services differed from the number he entered on the 
information card at Cash-a-Check (Tr. 45-46). Mr. Dixon further 
stated that the check in question, #1131, was among the checks 
which had been stolen, and had not been signed by him (Tr. 30). 
Finally, he stated that a copy of a check he had signed which was 
on his desk the night prior to the burglary, had also been stolen 
(Tr. 32-33). 
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the verdict, this Court should review the evidence and 
all inferences which may be drawn form it in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. The evidence presented by the 
State and failure of defendant to provide an explanation of his 
actions allowed the jury to infer that defendant committed the 
crime of forgery. 
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RQIBT-I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient for the jury to convict him. Specifically, he 
argues: 1) there was no evidence connecting him with the theft of 
checks at Stacey Enterprises; and 2) his actions were 
inconsistent with those of a person knowingly trying to pass a 
forged check. 
This Court has adopted the following standard of review 
when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 
The standard for determining sufficiency of 
the evidence is that the evidence be "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds could not reasonably believe 
defendant had committed a crime." gtfrte y« 
BQS&LQi 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). In 
determining whether evidence is sufficient, 
the Court will review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. KereKfiS* 622 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (Utah 1980). Unless there is a clear 
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict 
will be upheld. State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 
811, 814 (Utah 1977). 
State v. ffafrfrldpn, 735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987). As noted in 
gtate yt BQpKfilf 7 0 9 p* 2 d 3*2 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
•It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." SJtatfi 
X±-L&W, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
flCCfltd ££fli£_Xx_lind£D# Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983). So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops. 
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Id. at 345 (citation omitted). And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
upheld. £lal£_iA_fl£tf£lii 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, 
•on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict." State„.,¥«. 
IS&a£S£fl# 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (cilina State v. HowgU* 
649 P.2d at 93) .* 
Defendant's insufficiency argument is little more than 
a request for this Court to engage in a d£ novo review of the 
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and 
then to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. As is 
evident from the authority cited above, this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have stated that they will not review a criminal 
case in that fashion. 
The present case is similar to State vt Williams. 712 
P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). There, defendant presented a check to a 
muffler shop to pay for repairs. The check was payable to 
defendant and was drawn on the business account of the William 
Angell Construction Company. The Court stated: 
Examining the evidence is support of this 
verdict, Mr. Angell testified that the check, 
along with two other checks, had been taken 
from the office located in his home. He 
further testified that he did not know 
* The State is aware of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision 
in SMte.Y* Walkey, Utah, No. 20921, slip op. at 3 (August 25, 
1987). There, the Court adopted a new standard of review in 
sutticiency of evidence cases where defendant has had a bench 
trial. Because the trial in the instant case was a jury trial, 
Walker is inapplicable. 
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defendant, had never employed him, did not 
owe him money, and that he had not written 
the check nor authorized anyone to do so. 
Defendant presented no evidence to controvert 
the logical inferences which could be drawn 
by the jury, i.e., that without any 
explanation as to where he got the check or 
from whom, the defendant knew the check was 
forged. The evidence against defendant was 
not so inherently improbable that it would 
necessitate a reasonable doubt in the minds 
of reasonable persons as to his guilt. 
Id. at 223. 
In the instant case, defendants argument that no 
evidence was presented linking him with the theft of the checks 
is immaterial. Because defendant was charged with forgery, not 
theft, the State was under no burden to prove that he took the 
checks. Even assuming defendant did not commit a theft, 
sufficient evidence existed to convict him of forgery. 
The jury made a logical inference from the following 
evidence that defendant forged the check in question: 1) the 
check had been stolen from Stacey Enterprises (Tr. 30); 2) Mr. 
Dixon had not signed the stolen check, nor authorized anyone else 
to do so (Tr. 30); 3) a copy of a check signed by Mr. Dixon has 
also been stolen (Tr. 32), inferring tnat the check was taken to 
assist in a forgery; 4) although defendant was not employed by 
Stacey Enterprises (Tr. 20-21), he listed this as his place of 
employment on the information card he completed at Cash-a-Check 
(Tr. 18); 5) defendant listed an incorrect social security number 
on the information card at Cash-a-Check (Tr. 45-46); 6) as in 
Hilli.fiffi£# defendant presented no evidence to controvert the 
logical inferences which could be drawn by the juryt that 
defendant had forged the check. Based upon the above facts 
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presented at trial, sufficient evidence existed to convict 
defendant of forgery. 
Defendant's final claim that his actions were 
inconsistent with those of a person knowingly trying to pass a 
forged check is a question for the jury. The jury had the duty 
to review all of the evidence and determine whether it supported 
a conviction of forgery. Sufficient facts existed to find that 
defendant was attempting to pass a forged check and the jury was 
under no obligation to find that defendant could not have 
committed the crime of forgery because his actions were 
illogical. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendants conviction. 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^J^-
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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